

**CENTRE FOR ADVANCED
STRATEGIC STUDIES**

The Centre for Advanced Strategic Studies (CASS), Pune was registered on 21st September, 1992 under the Society's Registration Act, 1860, and as a Charitable Public Trust on 28th October, 1992, under the Bombay Charitable Public Trust Act of 1950. The Department of Scientific and Industrial Research, Ministry of Science and Technology, Government of India have accorded recognition to CASS as a Scientific and Industrial Research Institution. The Centre has been granted extension of IT exemption U/S.80G from 01.04.2008 to 31.03.2011 vide letter No.Pn / CIT I / 12A (a) / 80G / 396 / 2008-09 / 4587 dated 30.01.2009 and U/S.10(23C)(iv) for AY 2004-2005 and onwards vide Government of India Notification No.80/2007 dated 26.03.2007. Section 10(23C)(iv) gives hundred percent exemption for income of the Centre, and Section 80G gives fifty percent exemption to the donors. ITE U/S 80G is now in perpetuity.

The Centre aims at undertaking research and analysis of subjects relating to national and international security and development through seminars, discussions, publications at periodical intervals and close interaction with the faculty members and research students in allied disciplines in the Universities/Institutions and the Armed Forces. It expects to award research fellowships as soon as its corpus builds up and makes it possible. It aims to generate and promote interest among the academicians and public in these subjects with a view to making them alive to national security concerns. It has received very valuable support from the University of Pune in all its activities, specially from the Department of Defence and Strategic Studies. It has an Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Yashwantrao Chavan Academy of Development Administration (YASHADA) enabling mutual collaboration for making available their infrastructure, publications and teaching and research activities. The Centre has held a number of seminars, panel and group discussions.

ADDRESS :

Centre for Advanced Strategic Studies
M..M.D.W. Potdar Complex, Pune University Campus
Pune - 411 007
Tele Fax No. : 020-25697516
Tel. No. : 020-25690182
Email : cass182@bsnl.in



PROCEEDINGS OF SEMINAR

ON

THE KASHMIR IMBROGLIO

29th October, 2010

**CENTRE FOR ADVANCED
STRATEGIC STUDIES**

MEMBERS OF GOVERNING COUNCIL

Dr. Madhav Godbole : President
(Ex-Home Secretary, M
Govt. of India)

Air Chief Marshal (Retd) : M
H. Moolgavkar
(Ex-Chief of the Air Staff)

Admiral (Retd) : FM
J.G. Nadkarni : M
(Ex-Chief of the Naval Staff)

Prof. Gautam Sen : FM
(Former, DG & Member : M
Board of Trustees, IIE)

Shri MK Mangalmurti, : M
IFS (Retd)

Lt Gen (Retd) : M
Noble Thamburaj
(Former Vice Chief of the
Army Staff)

Lt Gen (Retd) : M
Amitav Mukherjee
(Former, DG, Air Def. Arty.)

Lt Gen (Retd) : M
D.B. Shekatkar
(Former Comdt.,
The Infantry School)

Air Marshal (Retd) : Director
S. Kulkarni : M
(Former Comdt., NDC)

Gp Capt (Retd) S.G. Chitnis : Dy. Dir./Secy./Tr.
: M

FM : Founder Member
M : Member

HONORARY LIFE MEMBERS

Shri R.D. Pradhan : M
(Ex-Governor,
Arunachal Pradesh)

Shri Abhay Firodia
Industrialist, Chairman,
Force Motors Ltd.

Air Cmde (Retd) Jasjit Singh
Director, Centre for Air Power Studies,
New Delhi

Shri Atul C. Kirloskar
Industrialist, Chairman & M.D.
Kirloskar Oil Engines Ltd.

CONTENTS

WELCOME BY DIRECTOR

AIR MARSHAL S. KULKARNI

Item		Page
Welcome by Director	: Air Marshal (Retd) S. Kulkarni	2
Main Speakers	: Col (Retd) Vijay Gidh, VSM Brig (Retd) Hemant Mahajan, YSM Brig (Retd) Pramathesh Raina	3
Closing Remarks by the Chairman	: Lt Gen (Retd) Dr. DB Shekatkar	46

Air Marshal (Retd) S. Kulkarni welcomed everyone present for the Seminar on “The Kashmir Imbroglia”. He said that we are fortunate to have Lt Gen (Retd) Dr. DB Shekatkar, member of the Governing Council of the Centre to chair the Seminar. He has had the opportunity to handle terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir region and also in India's north-east region at very high level. He is an eagerly sought speaker on the subject of national security and terrorism in India and also abroad. For today's Seminar, we have three members of the Centre as main speakers and many members in the audience who have been involved in the subject while in service and thereafter have kept themselves abreast of the developments in J&K. I look forward to an interesting interaction between the main speakers and the audience.

Col (Retd) Vijay Gidh had been on study leave with the Department of Defence Strategic Studies, University of Pune and has persevered in researching the Kashmir problem and visited the area to update his information. Brigadier (Retd) Hemant Mahajan has been frequently contributing articles on subjects relating to national security, on governance in India including in Jammu and Kashmir, on administration, on the political set up and political environment in almost all leading vernacular newspapers in Maharashtra. He is frequently invited to speak on these subjects in many places all over in Maharashtra. In Brigadier (Retd) Pramathesh Raina whose mothertongue is Kashmiri we have a prolific writer on Kashmir related subjects. He has just published a book titled “W(h)ither Kashmiriyat”. He is the Chhatrapati Shivaji Chair Professor in Pune University. We now look forward to an interesting Seminar on a very topical subject.

Editor : Gp Capt (Retd.) S. G. Chitnis, VSM Deputy Director, CASS
Address Centre for Advanced Strategic Studies, MMDW Potdar Complex, Pune University Campus, Pune 411007.
 Telefax : 020-25697516 / Tel. : 020-25690182
E-mail : cass182@bsnl.in / casspune@yahoo.com
Website : www.cfass.org.in

**SEMINAR ON
THE KASHMIR IMBROGLIO**

Chairman : Lt Gen (Retd) Dr. DB Shekatkar
Main Speakers : Col (Retd) VY Gidh
Brig (Retd) Pramathesh Raina
Brig (Retd) Hemant Mahajan

PAPER PRESENTED BY COL (RETD) VY GIDH, VSM

Honourable Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen,

It is a great honour and proud privilege to speak on an important topic such as Kashmir to an August gathering, many of whom have been veterans in the Indo-Pak wars or seen active service in J&K. I thank Director, CASS for giving me this opportunity. While some of us have had adequate experience in serving only as sub unit or unit commanders in combating insurgency in J&K or the North East, many of our experienced veterans present have also been instrumental in the decision making process during crucial stages in these troubled states. My mandate is primarily to cover the situation in the Kashmir Valley prior to its deterioration in June-July 2010, try and analyse the causes for the sudden deterioration, and assess the present situation as obtaining in the Valley today. I was fortunate to be able to visit Kashmir earlier this month and assess the actual situation on the ground. The aspects outlined during the course of my talk is based on my interaction with various types of people involved or affected by the current spate of unrest in the Valley.

Introduction

During the past five months or so, we have seen Kashmir sink into violent clashes, just when everyone thought things were brightening up in this troubled state.

Why did the situation suddenly deteriorate since mid June 2010 onwards ? Was it the death of Tufail Mattoo and other civilians in police action, that triggered a series of violent protests and more deaths in the Valley; or was it a spontaneous outburst of pent-up anger against the state government and its administration for its inefficiency in improving the living conditions of the common man ; or were it the smaller issues like the Sopore killings and Machhil encounters, or the Amarnath land row of 2008; or was there an external hand and that of seperatists /vested interests in sponsoring and fuelling the current unrest, so that it eventually takes the shape of 'Calls of Azadi'? Is this a new Pakistani Game Plan in the Valley, after all its previous strategies to annex Kashmir had failed over the past 60 years ?

Though there has been some respite now from the ongoing unrest, yet Geelani and his supporters will spare no effort to ensure that the agitation is prolonged.

How serious are the agitators about their demand for 'Azadi', and what does it actually imply ? We ought to look at the reasons for the new 'Intifada' and calls of 'Azadi', as well as what exactly is the ground situation in the Valley. Let us examine these aspects during the talk.

The Situation in Early June 2010

During the period January 2009 till June 2010, the Valley witnessed almost normalcy in all spheres. The State Assembly and Lok Sabha elections had seen over 60% voter turnout despite boycott calls from the militants. In January 2009, swearing in of Omar Abdullah as Chief Minister raised hopes of a new era for the people of J&K. Violence in the Valley touched an all time low and there were less number of infiltrations reported from across the border. The Valley witnessed a record number of approximately 5.5 lakh tourists visiting during the period January to June 2010. Over 1,00,000 Kashmiri Pandits congregated in Srinagar, which was the largest gathering since the ethnic cleansing some 20 years ago. The Pandits were welcomed by the Kashmiri Muslims, raising hopes of a new beginning. Kashmir perhaps seemed to have found it's long last glory

as the 'Paradise on Earth'.

However this sense of normalcy during the past two years had a negative effect on the influence of Pakistani supporters, particularly the Hurriyat Conference, as well as the PDP which had been reduced to an opposition without power after the NC-Congress led State Government was formed. The Hurriyat had tried to rake up the Amarnath land issue in June, 2008 and play up the Shopian killings in mid 2009, in both cases covertly supported by the PDP. These instances did not flare up as planned by the anti national elements and the situation was brought under control.

Unfortunately, the local government had failed to capitalize on the mandate given to them by the people, as well as the gains made by the security forces and goodwill created by the Armed Forces during the past two years. It frittered away the opportunities given to them and failed to fulfill the promises it had made prior to the elections. Perhaps the political and administrative will to sort out the J&K problem too was lacking, as seen in previous instances.

Why the Situation Suddenly Flared Up

Though the Kashmir Valley witnessed a sense of normalcy during the past two years, the situation suddenly deteriorated from June-July 2010. Some of the major causes for this flare up are enumerated as under :-

- a) Ineffective government, it failed to capitalize on the mandate and improve the overall security situation in the Valley.
- b) The administrative machinery was weak and had failed to reach out to the common man.
- c) The NC-Congress combine had a fragile mass base and did little to improve itself at the grass root level, particularly in traditional Jamaati strongholds of Downtown Srinagar, Baramulla and Sopore town.

- d) There was large amount of corruption at all levels.
- e) Lack of employment and job opportunities in the State, gave rise to large number of unemployed youth falling prey to anti-national and anti-social elements.
- f) The common man was disenchanted and angry with the politicians, police brutality and other local grievances.
- g) This led to a simmering discontentment, disillusion and sense of frustration, particularly among the youth.
- h) The Amarnath Land Row of August 2008 and Shopian killings of mid 2009 were two issues which the Hurriyat or opposition PDP utilized to whip up anti-government sentiments. The Machhil false encounters of May 2010 and other human rights violations or killings of innocent civilians were other issues.
- j) There had been a gradual erosion of Sufi tradition and radicalization of Islam by vested interests over a period of time, as well gradual subversion of government agencies and elements in the Valley, which probably was not taken note of.
- k) Large presence of security forces, particularly in urban areas led to a sense of alienation among the locals.
- l) The sensational media as usual managed to present a distorted view of the situation for its own vested interests.
- m) Pakistan realized that its 'Game Plan' was up; had tried to sabotage the "Quiet Talks" between the Centre and Hurriyat Conference (Moderates) in 2009, and revive militancy and increase cross border infiltration from early 2010. Since their strategy had failed to create an impact, it was waiting for an opportunity to

destabilize the border state.

- n) Killing of Tufail Mattoo and other deaths in police firing in mid June 2010 and that of a local militant in an encounter in Sopore on 24 June 2010, led to a series of protests in the Valley. The death of an innocent child Fancy in Srinagar in early July 2010 was another trigger, which led to violent protests, more stone throwing incidents and further deterioration of the situation.
- o) The Pakistanis were waiting for an opportunity to rake up the Kashmir issue. They forced the Hurriyat to channelise the anger and alienation of the people and sponsor the present unrest. Initially the protests were against killings of innocent civilians and other human rights violations, which later took the form of 'Intifada' and gradually manipulated by vested interests into calls of "Azadi".
- p) Pakistan and its supporters in the Valley wanted to rake up the Kashmir issue in view of :-
 - i) Indo-Pak Talks scheduled in mid July 2010.
 - ii) UN General Assembly Session in September 2010.
 - iii) Commonwealth Games in October 2010.
 - iv) President Obama's forthcoming visit to India in November 2010.
- q) Unfortunately, the Indian response was not flexible enough to react to the situation. This led to a cascading effect and a cycle of violence.
- r) Initial incorrect handling of the situation by the Chief Minister and Kashmiri leadership, as well as the Centre, apart from provocation by separatists and vested interests, resulted in the situation going out of control. While the Chief Minister or State Government leaders made no effort to reach out to the families

affected by the recent killings, the Hurriyats would visit the concerned families, pay compensation as well as update their data base, wherein monthly payment was given to such families killed by police, CRPF or Army actions over the past 20 years.

- s) The reactions of the State and Central governments too were not very positive; initially it was more of passing the buck.
- t) Any efforts by the government to restore normalcy, was thwarted by the separatists.
- u) The protests against casualties were initially confined to traditionally Jamaiti strongholds of Downtown Srinagar, Sopore and certain pockets in the Valley. Unfortunately, due to more killings in subsequent firings, the protests spread to other areas of Anantnag, Pulwama and Baramulla districts, and later to almost the entire Valley. The protests including stone pelting were well orchestrated simultaneously by vested interests by the help of mobile phones and internet means. Though the agitators initially were mostly unemployed youths, gradually this spread to all sections of the society, including educated personnel of all age groups.
- v) Since the government and its agencies were found wanting in its efforts to deal with the deterioration in the situation, this gave rise to anti-national elements in exploiting the same to their advantage.

The situation in the Kashmir Valley was projected by various agencies e.g. Media, Press, Governmental authorities, vested interests, etc. in its own partisan view. No efforts were made initially to project the situation in its correct perspective by the government. Two excerpts from the press shown below highlight this aspect :

What Angers The Kashmiris

- Overwhelming presence of security forces in the Valley.
- Governing of Kashmir as though it is an occupied zone.
- Lack of economic opportunities and jobs.
- Firing at democratic protestors and other human rights violations.
- Killings of innocents and their being labeled as militants.
- No lodging of FIRs

Outlook, July 2010

J&K Under Siege?

- In Iraq, there is 1 soldier for every 166 people
- In Kashmir, there is 1 for every 20
- 1 Crore Population
- 5,00,000 Armed Troops
- 1,00,000 Army men
- 70,000 RR Soldiers
- 1,30,000 Central Police Forces

July 2010 marked 20 years of Controversial Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) in J&K. The people are angry, the Army is still there.

Is it time to start thinning out, or, Amend/Revoke/Repeal the Act, or seek its (partial) withdrawal in the State?

Times of India, July 2010

Azadi"- What Does It Mean?

Is it a generalized sentiment or an expression of anger, exploited by some political leaders and the separatist?

Is it freedom, right to self determination, autonomy, secession, plebiscite or Independence? (From both India and Pakistan)

Or, does it mean good governance, no corruption, create jobs/employability,

"Azadi means different things to different people. The common man is confused."

Stone Pelting – For A Price

Though stone pelting by the protestors against the J&K State Police and CRPF personnel deployed in the Valley has been common during the past few years, this took a well organized, orchestrated and violent shape during the June-July led 2010 agitations, in the form of 'Stone Terrorism'. Some pertinent questions which require due considerations are as given below:-

Who Are These Stone Pelters? Why Are They Throwing? How Is It So Well Organised Simultaneously At Different Places?

Funded By Separatist Organizations and Some Political Parties? A New Form Of Gunless Terrorism, Lucrative Business For Unemployed Youth, Paid Rs 100 - 500 per day; Stone Throwing Has Become A Cottage Industry, Business Worth Rs 5-8 Lakhs

Why Are Parents Permitting Their Children To Throw Stones (and get killed)?

Are Any Children Of Leaders Of Political Parties/ Separatists Getting Involved In Stone Throwing? Are Sons Of Affluent Among The Protesters?

Protest Calendars

Syed Ali Shah Geelani and his supporters have resorted to 10 days Protest Calendars to paralyse the state government.

10 Day Protest Calendar

- ✓ 07 OCT (Thu) - Complete Strike, Observe As "SOLITARY DAY"
- ✓ 08 OCT (Fri) - No Strike (Normal Activities)
- ✓ 09 OCT (Sat) - Observe Complete Shutdown, Present Memo to UN General Secretary
- ✓ 10 OCT (Sun) - Observe Complete Shutdown Visit Martyr Graveyards
- ✓ 11 OCT (Mon) - No Strike
- ✓ 12 OCT (Tue) - Observe Complete Strike, Peaceful Protest

- ✓ 13 OCT (Wed) - Observe Complete Strike
- ✓ 14 OCT (Thu) - No Strike
- ✓ 15 OCT (Fri) - Observe Complete Strike
- ✓ 16 OCT (Sat) - No Strike
- ✓ 27 OCT (Wed) - Shutdown, Protest March to UN Headquarters Against Landing of Indian Troops in J & K on 27 October 1947.

Protestors clashed at separate places across the valley- 10 locals and few policemen injured.

Government Strategy

- ✓ Impose Strict Curfew In Parts Of Srinagar And Valley To Prevent The Separatist March
- ✓ Place Separatist Leaders Under House Arrest
- ✓ Private Transport Plies Normally, All Educational Institutions And Government Offices Function Normally

The Present Situation

The common man in the Kashmir Valley is generally fed up with three types of people in the Valley – the ineffective government and corrupt civil administration; the state police and CRPF for its high handedness; and the Hurriyats and separatists for prolonging the agitation and creating disturbances in the Valley. The general public which has been badly affected by the ongoing violence during the past four months shows no interest in the Protest Calendar or agitations sponsored by Geelani or his supporters. The situation obtaining today in the Valley can be summarized as under:

- a) Gradual restoration of normalcy. Functioning of government offices, schools and educational institutions inspite of Hurriyat activists preventing school children and torching buses.
- b) Declining writ of Geelani and his supporters. The 10 Day Protest Calendar of Geelani does not generate much interest

as before. The common man adversely affected by the agitation, is more worried of his daily earnings.

- c) Growing effectiveness of security forces. Implementation of Joint Strategy by the Indian Army and J&K Police to thwart the Hurriyat Calendar has been gaining success.
- d) Increase in infiltration across the border (prior to onset of winter) and militant activities in areas around Srinagar, probably to offset the gradual restoration of normalcy.
- e) A positive trend in reporting by newspapers and attitude of locals (letters to the editor).
- f) Only certain sections of locals are still keen on “Azadi”, though well aware of its adverse implications. Majority would like J&K to remain part of India and are well aware of the adverse situation obtaining in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
- g) Unemployment remains a major issue, which needs to be addressed. Stone throwers attend Army and state police recruitment rallies, as well as pick up stones/gun !
- h) The State government has ordered a Commission of Inquiry against the recent killings. It also seeks prosecution of certain Army men involved in alleged fake encounters.
- i) Panchayat Polls are scheduled later this year.
- j) Naming of the three Interlocutors for J&K by the Centre, i.e. Mr. Dileep Padgaonkar, Mr. Ansari and Mrs. Radha Kumar has not evoked much interest among the locals, though the hardliners have termed it as a sham. It is a step in the right direction.
- k) The tourism sector has been badly affected.
- l) Parents are worried that the students may lose a complete

academic year due to the unrest, unless corrective measures are taken immediately.

- m) General public is fed up with agitations, now seeks good governance, employment and regain of self-respect.
- n) Majority in J&K, including the Valley want to be integrated with the mainstream and reap the economic and other benefits enjoyed by the Indians elsewhere. It is our duty to see that it takes place.

Peace, progress and prosperity in J&K is what everyone prays for. Hope it comes!

Thank You.

**PAPER PRESENTED
BY BRIG (RETD) HEMANT MAHAJAN, YSM**

Losing the Public Diplomacy Battle on Kashmir

Indian government has lost the war on perception management in Kashmir, rest of India and in the eyes of the rest of the world.

The BBC has commented “ India's inability to tackle the stone-pelters could lead to rebooting of the jihadi militancy in Kashmir. That, however, doesn't imply that Indian state can continue with the current state of drift and not make serious, earnest and even unpopular attempts to bring the situation under control. The reason is simple: because it is the primary constitutional duty of the Indian state to establish the rule of law and ensure safety and security of all its citizens, including in the state of Jammu and Kashmir.”

Gen SK Sinha had said , “We have done well in combating violence in Jammu and Kashmir and restoring normalcy, we have been lagging behind on the propaganda front. This weakness needs to be rectified . More than half this battle is taking place for the hearts and minds of Kashmiris, rest of India and other countries.”

MHA 2009 Kashmir Review

The Union Ministry of Home stated, during 2009 the number of terrorism-related incidents had dropped by 27 per cent, killing of civilians by 17 per cent and security forces by 19 per cent, compared to 2008. J&K DGP Kuldeep Khoda declared, "This year [2009], we have achieved a milestone. It is for the first time in 20 years that less than 500 violent incidents took place in the state." This was the lowest level of violence in two decades in J&K, plunged below the 1990 figures, as many as 235 militants were killed by army during the year.

ISI Strategy

ISI bleeding India by 1000 cuts and follows the following policy. Governments may change but ISI never changes its grand strategy. Jihad is not only a means to an end but also an end in itself. “He, who dies in the course of jihad is blessed by Allah.”

Price of Stone Terrorism

- Civilians killed 137.
- During the same time soldiers killed 76, army officers killed 12, more than 3000 CRPF / J&K police injured, terrorist killed 241 elsewhere in valley.
- Perception in valley- azadi around corner, some more deaths in firing and a nudge by Obama, azadi would be achieved.
- 50,000 job cuts in tourism, 50,000 in other sectors.
- 1990-2007- 1800 days lost ie four years. Hurriyat should pay for these losses.
- 138 days of hartal/curfew in 2010, each day costs 100 crores.
- 13,800 crores loss to people in 2010.
- Lot of industry shifted outside the state.
- Loss of education.
- Common man's perception in India-Kashmir burning and will break away any time.

Being an Anti National Ensures Getting Invitations for Talks

India must be the only country in the world where being an anti national means getting invitations for talks with the government. Mirwaiz and Geelani should have been booked months ago and punished for their anti-India activities. They not only instigated Kashmiri youth to attack soldiers but also vitiated the entire atmosphere in the Valley bringing normal life to a halt and using Kashmiri youth as fodder, resulting in so many killings of young boys. The killers in Kashmir are these two pro-Pakistani elements, who would have been taken to task by any government with a spine much earlier. In such a situation, instead of talking tough, the government is only giving confused signals to 'soften' (whatever that means) the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) but making gestures to terrorist supporters to come to talk. Talks, can be held only when the atmosphere is ripe for it and the other side, is willing to talk within the Indian constitution.

"Army Is Not The Enemy"

"Self-preservation is the default mode of Omar Abdullah trapped in an existential dilemma. He cannot blame himself for the wreck he has wrought. To do so would severely damage, a political career. He has, therefore, selected the only escape route he could think of: blame the Indian Army. After 90 deaths in 90 days, the dilution of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act has become the fulcrum of his political fortunes. Is it not known that during the year 2010 11 officers, 68 Jawans have been killed and more than 300 soldiers seriously injured and 204 terrorists killed in Kashmir. He did not offer to leave because of the complete collapse of governance. He threatened to resign if the Union government did not punish the Indian Army.

Not a single death in the present crisis has resulted from an Army bullet. Those bullets came from the guns of the J&K police and CRPF. Why has everyone chosen to obscure this fact with silence and raise dust against the Army?

This question has disturbing dimensions. Why have separatists and militants never demanded that the state government disband the local police for taking such a toll? Why is the secessionist, and alas political, verbiage targeted at the Army and no one but the Army? The Army has not been deployed in the demonstrations, and is concentrating only on its counter-insurgency role.

For Whom Is The Indian Soldier Fighting?

Have they ever thought what effect these gestures by the government have on the morale of the soldiers? It pains immensely to see how our secular media sirens show their undiluted love for the separatists on TV screens and they go to the streets of Srinagar only to interview the unpatriotic people. When they invite any of the anti national separatists on their shows, they display an utter lack of sensitivity towards those who love their country and give all the space and time to those voices of insanity and violence with a soft, affectionate anchoring you seldom witness when they put on trial any

leader showing patriotic leanings.

Indian Soldier Despised, Hated By Pseudo Secular Media and Society

Because of disinformation campaign that it is army which is ruling Kashmir, the Indian soldier is despised, hated and made responsible for all the bad happenings, in a sweeping manner in TV studios or on the editorial pages of the media empires. No one has tried to see the dangerous, hardened daily routine a soldier is subjected to from 6 am to sunset, and after that the night vigil. Ask any politician acting as an apologist for the separatist murderers, has he ever thought of sending his child to the army?

Is it not known that 4000-4500 soldiers die on line of duty every year, out of which 750-1000 die while carrying out anti terrorist operations including 35-45 officers. Is there any organization in the country which sacrifices so much? In fact Mr. V.P. Singh Prime Minister in 1989 had given up on Kashmir but it was the Indian Army which held on to Kashmir for the nation.

Whether soldier is in the Army or in CRPF, the story is the same. He is there not because he wanted to loot and rape and maim people. He was sent by the Indian government to safeguard the interests of the nation and the Constitution. "The grievances of Kashmiri youth should be done through good governance and a mechanism that can win their trust and not through "Srinagar-CM-living-in-Delhi" or politicians like Mehbooba Mufti who never find time to place a wreath on the body of a soldier martyred in Kashmir."

The soldier would be too happy to go back to his barracks and celebrate Diwali and Eid with family. In the Delhi's secular power brokers, a soldier is just another employee to be denied a justifiable demand of "one rank-one pension" by those politicians who raise their salaries 300% in a jiffy.

Public Diplomacy A Neglected Field

The country must immediately start a public diplomacy campaign to correct the distorted view about Kashmir. Public diplomacy is a neglected field in the glacial paced Indian government. The latest example of this failure is Kashmir where the Indian government is on the losing end in this battle of shaping the public opinion. This failure of public diplomacy is shaping incorrect perceptions and attitudes in local and global populace about the Kashmir issue. It is giving ammunition to India's adversaries, including the Kashmiri separatists, Pakistan in the struggle for winning the hearts and minds of the Kashmiri population.

The media coverage on Kashmir — in television and print — has been focused on pinning the blame on the Indian state. This has happened as the government has allowed the separatists to establish the playing field. This has, in part, resulted in the valid grouse among the security forces that unlike them, the violent stone throwers and Hurriyat are not held accountable for their actions because major sections of the Indian media inhabit a charming world of adjudicated conflict. The reality however is that government's passivity to disburse information equates to surrendering to the disinformation campaign of separatists and subverted media persons based in Srinagar.

Battle for The Minds of The People

This failure, stems from the Indian government's inability to recognize that the battlefield in Kashmir between violent stone-pelting mobs and law-enforcing security forces isn't a physical battle any more. The battle is for the minds of the people of Kashmir, rest of India and the rest of the world.

If public opinion is being misled by a media that is ignorant, uneducated and anti national, simply blaming the media is not good enough. The challenge is upon the government to correct this misinformation campaign by explaining correct position. Exactly who is responsible for explaining India's position to the rest of the world? Ministry of External Affairs. Perhaps, more importantly, who is

responsible for explaining India's position on Kashmir to its own people: the state government, the Home Ministry, Defence Ministry, I&B Ministry, PMO, PIB or Door Darshan? As of now, it seems nobody. When spokespersons of the ruling political party defend the government on television, they still only defend the party, and do not speak for the government of India. Regardless, public diplomacy is not about merely involving a specific bureaucracy or a specific ministry: the Indian government must use all the wings of government. It is an activity of national importance, not merely of public relations. The government needs to be mobilised and sent into battle to win this information war.

Winning Information War Every Ministry's Task

In the Kargil War the coordinated efforts of all ministries of the government to conduct the public diplomacy campaign was commendable. The Ministry of Home Affairs has to take the lead in conducting this campaign, actively supported by the PMO, Defence Ministry and the Ministry for External Affairs. The Defence Minister till date has never supported the fact that not even one person has been killed by Army firing. .

Why the Ministry of External Affairs when Kashmir is our internal matter? Because whether we like it or not, Kashmir has been and still remains an important foreign policy agenda point for India .

Demography : J&K

Out of the total population of 10.14 million, Kashmir accounts for 54 percent, Jammu, 43.6 percent and Ladakh 2.4 percent. Religion wise, Muslims constitute 67 percent, Hindus 29.8 percent, Buddhists 1 percent and others 0.2 percent.

Perception Management in Jammu and Kashmir : Short, Medium and Long Term Options

Correct Perception Management will have an exponential effect on the outcome of any war or counter terrorist operation. The effects

could well have a long term effect on the psyche of the people. A successful Perception Management campaign can undermine the base of an uprising and take the wind off its sails. This presentation aims to examine the Perception Management in Jammu and Kashmir in the short, medium and long term against the backdrop of current internal security situation and environment.

Target Audience and Methodology of Management

Composition. The target audience in Jammu and Kashmir is a mixture of Kashmiri Muslims, Rajput Muslims, Gujjars, Bakkarwals, Hindus and some Sikhs. The education levels in most villages in the hinterland can be considered as functional illiterates. However, there are urban pockets of Srinagar, Anantnag, Badgam, Baramulla, Doda, Jammu, Kupwara, Leh, Pulwama, Poonch, Rajouri and Udhampur. The population broadly consists of the following opinion makers: -

- (a) Grassroots Level. Local politicians, grassroots level political workers and village opinion makers play an important role in shaping perceptions. "The tragedy of debate on Jammu and Kashmir has been that the authorities in India as well as the international community, have shown far too much interest in the views of those professing violence and ignoring those pursuing peaceful reconciliation." The perception of the local population needs to be moulded to make their local leaders accountable for their actions.
- (b) Victims of Violence. At present there are about 54,000 widows and about 1,00,000 children affected by violence and orphaned by the conflict. The conflict has displaced as many as 3,50,000 people within India. A significant section that, if addressed, would greatly improve the perceptions of the people.
- (c) Youth and Children. Another significant section of the target audience is the school and college going children and job seeking youth of the area. They need to be

addressed with greater enthusiasm and efforts.

- (d) Expatriates and Migrants. Another segment of the target audience is the number of people from Jammu and Kashmir who are studying and working in other states in India. The estimate is about 20,000 students and 1,00,000 people staying in other states to earn their living
- (e) Inimical Forces. These include the following: -
- (i) Local terrorists and over ground workers.
 - (ii) Separatist political leaders.

Current Perceptions. Nine Kashmiris in ten oppose the state of Jammu and Kashmir being divided on the basis of religion or ethnic group. The vast majority of Kashmiris oppose the prospect of war between India and Pakistan as a means to establish a permanent solution to the situation in Kashmir, preferring the option of democratic elections. They also believe in the unique cultural identity of the region should be preserved in any long-term solution.

Medium. Selection of appropriate media for perception management is extremely important. Since insurgency is a battle for the hearts and minds of the people, media is the most potent weapon for conducting psychological initiatives.

Print Media. The penetration of print media especially the mainstream and regional newspapers is very low, this can be attributed both to the lack of roads and language. The spoken languages include, Kashmiri, Gujjiri, Hindi and some Punjabi. In the closed Kashmiri societies the women speak only Kashmiri and hence are relatively less influenced by the psychological operations campaigns so far. The correct choice of language is extremely important and this is where newspapers in vernacular have immense value. The correct choice of language is applicable to other media as well.

Electronic Media - TV. The penetration of the popular electronic media of television is very limited owing to the lack of electric supply

and economics. In terms of flexibility, reach and acceptance, this is probably the most important medium today and needs to be fully exploited.

Internet. The power of the Internet is being exploited by the terrorists in a major way. It must be realized that the adversaries in Perception Management are extremely media savvy. A beginning needs to be made by all District Headquarters having their web sites. Facilities can be provided to local newspapers and channels to have their respective web sites. This would fill the vacuum for information as the local press and media channels enjoy credibility.

E-Mail and SMS Campaigns. This is an important means which should be exploited by the state government.

Radio (AIR, BBC and FM). Radio remains the most popular form of entertainment and news in Jammu and Kashmir. The cost factor, portability and independence from electric power are the main reasons. With the spread of FM channels in Jammu Region, radio holds a lot of promise. In this era of re-mix, the popularity of FM channels takes just a few weeks to establish in an area.

Direct Interaction with People. This can be achieved by the following measures: -

- a) Use of loudspeakers during Op Sadbhavana projects like medical camp, inauguration of schools, hospitals etc.
- b) It is also achieved by directly targeting captive audience like schools and colleges
- c) The impact of visit by political leaders and civilian dignitaries is not to be missed and should be vigorously encouraged at appropriate levels.
- d) Articulate young achievers of the state including college and school children, should also tour the remote area (may be under security force protection, if required) and carry out direct interaction.

Posters/Leaflets. There is a good impact of the posters that are being put up as a part of the psychological operations campaign. However, one must consider the effort required to make an impact. In the Iraq war, the US had distributed 40 million leaflets before the launch of the war and another 40 million were distributed once the operations were launched.

Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs). The NGOs are not fully operational in Jammu and Kashmir due to apprehensions of security. However there are a handful of youth groups, blood banks and orphanages, but no developmental NGOs or trade associations.

Others. There are a number of other innovative media that have been used to put across peace themes in conflict-ridden areas. These include Street dramas and plays, Car Stickers, Photo Exhibitions, Radio and Television documentaries.

Necessity of Embedment of Journalists/Articles

Embedment of Journalists

The old Churchillian adage, “A lie can get half way around the world before the truth can put its pants on” becomes doubly true with today's technologies. In view of the background, embedment of some national and regional journalists may be a good idea.

Other than this, private media channels (there are quite a few today) must also be given access to produce first hand reporting of the counter terrorism operations and 'winning hearts and minds' measures undertaken by the government and security forces.

Articles

The commissioning or embedment of articles is more deliberate and has a deep impact on discerning and educated amongst the local population.

Current Challenges to Effective Perception Management

The tactics of 'bandh' adopted in the nineties in the Kashmir Valley by the separatists exploited the vulnerabilities of a democracy and carried out hostile propaganda in the absence of censorship. The 'bandhs' and protests mobilized the masses and caused hardships to the common man. The common man also questioned the ability of the state to provide basic security in the society. The security forces had begun to grow wary of the large (engineered) protests and great efforts were required to maintain the operational momentum against the armed cadres.

Refinement of Current Methodology

Journalists, anthropologists and political scientists, side by side with veteran military, intelligence and police have to be mobilized to assure creation of the best messages and coordination among the various government agencies. The Unified Command set up is the organizational set up that is best geared to handle the challenge of Perception Management.

Focus of Perception Management

By definition Perception Management includes all actions used to influence the attitudes and objective reasoning of foreign audiences and consists of Public Diplomacy, Psychological Operations (Psy Ops), Public Information, Deception and Covert Action. “Peace cannot be established till the time the Kashmiris remain alienated. One of the major reasons for this alienation is related to the perception that they have been denied the benefits of democracy and basic rights. The minimum that needs to be done, therefore, is to assure Kashmiris of their place as equal citizens within India's liberal democratic set up”. With this vast canvas that is covered by perception management, it is necessary to focus the resources available in the short, medium and long terms

Short, Medium and Long Term Security Calculus

An understanding of the security calculus in the future would greatly assist in focusing the perception management measures, and various influencing factors.

Recommended Focus for Short, Medium and Long Terms

Short Term (one year). It is relevant to take into account the reduced number of terrorist initiated violent incidents and the significant progress made by the political process both within Jammu and Kashmir and between India and Pakistan. The following issues merit attention: -

- a) There is an overwhelming sentiment against violence in Kashmir today. Militancy may not be down and out, but it has lost a great deal of the popular legitimacy it once commanded. A large number of credible field surveys and opinion polls reveal that over 90 per cent of the Kashmiri people now disapprove of violence and feel that an armed struggle is neither desirable nor a feasible way to achieve political goals.” The older themes of territorial integrity and legality of the state's merger with India could be put on the backburner. The focus should be on human development index. In the short term, the focus is recommended to be on the rewards of peace – better infrastructure, better education and reduced human rights violations. The projection of achievements of Lieutenant Commander Prism, a Kashmiri woman officer in the Indian Navy, in the media was very cleverly done and extremely well received even in remote areas of the state.
- b) This must be contrasted with the near chaos situation in Baluchistan, the use of attack helicopter gunships against civilians and the Talibanisation of much of the Afghan Border with Pakistan. Amitabh Mattoo said “There is a strong disillusionment with Pakistan. The political and social conditions prevailing within Pakistan have not gone

unnoticed in the Kashmir Valley. The near total absence of a civil society, and the almost Orwellian control that is exercised in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir have all left a deep impression on Kashmiris.” The situation in the Shia majority Gilgit and Baltistan is even worse. Gilgit-Baltistan has an overall literacy rate of 33 per cent (male 40 per cent, female 25 per cent). Approximately 82 per cent of government-run primary and middle schools are for boys only.

- c) Improving perceptions in the short term is very essential to improve the tourist inflow to Jammu and Kashmir, which is one of the main pillars of the state economy. This would also strengthen the hands of the moderates and help in minimizing fresh recruitment into terrorist cadres. The whole focus should be to contrast the development and democracy of Jammu and Kashmir versus the deprivation in Pak Occupied Kashmir. The image of the security forces as apolitical guardians of democracy in its true sense must be conveyed.

Medium Term (1-2 years). In the medium term, the efforts must focus at greater integration with the balance of the country by highlighting the success achieved by various people of Jammu and Kashmir in other parts the country. Already a very large number of youth is seeking education, employment and business opportunities in other parts of the country. If the present momentum of security forces operation is continued, it may be possible for further reduction in the violence against civilians. A stage may be set for the security agencies to be moved away from the media lights. This is when the truly political phase of the counter terrorism movement in Jammu and Kashmir would commence. Political activity of various hues must dominate the media and this alone would expel the perception, especially in the international press that the whole of Jammu and Kashmir is under security forces' control. It is worthwhile mentioning here that already the process has been set in motion. It is axiomatic that even the extremist organisations would increase their efforts to manage perception of the people.

Long Term (3-5 years). In the long term, the focus should be to convey the benefits of democracy under the Union of India. Following are random excerpts of a lecture delivered by US Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld on state of Military-Media relations. “ *The standard US government public affairs operation was designed primarily to respond to individual request for information. It tends to be reactive, not proactive, and it still operates for most part on an eight hour, five or six-day-a-week basis, while world events and our enemies are operating 24X7, across every time zone. That's an unacceptable dangerous deficiency. Consider that the violent extremists have established media relations committees-these are terrorists and they have media relations committees that meet and talk about strategy, not with bullets but with words. They've proven to be highly successful at manipulating the opinion elites of the world. They plan and design their headline-grabbing attacks using every means of communication to intimidate and break the collective will of free people. They know that communication transcend borders and that a single news story handled skillfully can be as damaging to our cause and helpful to theirs as any other method of military attack. And they're doing it. They're able to act quickly. They have relatively few people. They have modest resources compared to the vast and expensive bureaucracies of Western governments. The terrorists are trained. They're trained to put out misinformation, and they're very good at it.*” Probably the situation has an echo in our predicament in Jammu and Kashmir. By harping on Jammu and Kashmir as a dispute, Pakistan has gained much mileage in the international media. It has been able to cover up its misadventures and support the simmering discontent in Jammu and Kashmir. If we look at the definition again it is evident that covert operations also form a part of perception management. It is this facet, which works against open societies and democracies. The terror in London underground, 9/11, Mumbai and Varanasi blasts, Bali bombings and the like are tools designed to shape the perceptions of millions of people. In the long term, the organizations like Al Qaida and the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) have to be tackled not only in the arena of security but also in the field of perception management and in the race for catching the popular imagination. In the long term, the perception of advantage of booming Indian economy, secularism, greater integration with the free world and unity in diversity must be

spread not only in J& K but also in other parts of the country. In short we must make the most of our soft power.

Elements of Soft Power.

For a layman the major elements of soft power that can be used are academic and cultural exchanges, civilisation and spiritual values, economic prosperity, democratic values, attractiveness of a religion, secularism and religious freedom. The minor elements are cuisine, sports, foreign students, tourism, entertainment.

Kashmiriyat

The religious and cultural identity of the people of Jammu and Kashmir and beliefs of Sufism and tolerance needs to be further highlighted. This is the only way to counter the 'pan islamic jihad of hatred' that is being propagated by the likes of Al Qaeda.

Interlocutors Solutions Worse Than The Problem?

- Involve Pak in Kashmir talk.
- Amend constitution to make way for azadi.
- Stone pelters asked to make road map for azadi. where does army's perception figure?
- Instead of quiet dialogue –gone for sound byte unilaterism and unnecessary public statements.
- Hurriyat response - dirty trick to please Obama. 13 days calender issued for protests.

Satyamev Jayate - “Truth Alone Triumphs”

The whole of the government must act now. It is time to stop accepting the propaganda of our enemies. This is about them, not us. Let the government expose the Kashmiri separatist leadership for what it really is — a threat to all liberal, democratic societies, supporters of subjugating women by seeking implementation of the Shariah, killers of young children by pushing them at the front of violent mobs, violent criminals indulging in arson by burning schools

and public property, tacit supporters of jihadi terror and hypocrites who use all the facilities of the Indian state while decrying it at the same time. Winning the ideological battle against these enemies of India requires conscious, yet subtle, sustained and coordinated efforts from the government of India.

Satyamev Jayate — “Truth Alone Triumphs” — remains India's national motto. Yes, truth shall prevail in the end. But it can only prevail if it is brought out in the open first. Can the government please start now?

Azadi from the following is the only Way Ahead from

Pak Sponsored Terrorism, Likes Of Hurriyat Conference and Mehbooba Mufti, Bad Governance, Live In Delhi /Incompetent Politicians, Religious Fundamentalism, Corrupt Politicians, Bureaucrats, Pseudo Secularists like Arundhati Roy, Disinformation Campaign, Wrong Expectations, and Inflated Self Importance That They Are Special. Every Indian Is Special,

Appeasing The Protestors And The Separatists

Now to the other big issue of political gestures that Centre should announce to reconcile with the protestors and the separatists. One of the newspapers has listed its wish-list of six steps that Centre should immediately announce like announce talks with separatists and a dialogue with Pakistan, Centre should meet Syed Ali Shah Geelani half-way, amend the Armed Forces (Special) Powers Act to make it humane. Lifting curbs on an organisation is dependant on dangers it is capable of posing to civil society and maintainance of law and order. Hurriyat Conference has been always a mouth piece of Pakistan and the amount of violence it has imposed on India is very substantial. It will only be a miracle if Hurriyat ever accepts a solution within the frame work of Indian constitution.

When a violent mob tries to coerce the Indian state into submission, it is perhaps not the best time to make any concessions as it is tantamount to conceding to blackmail. It also sends the message across to everyone else in the country that the Indian government is only amenable to the language of violence and coercion.

So, how and when should the big political steps come then? Firstly, they should, and necessarily must, come after the violence has been suppressed and normalcy has been restored in the state. More importantly, these political steps must seen to have been initiated at the behest of the state government. That is perhaps the time to bolster the credibility of the Chief Minister Omar Abdullah.

Integrating The Valley Socially And Politically

The state government indeed needs to go beyond even these political gestures or plans of economic development. It must also dispel the impression that three or four districts of Kashmir valley are the equivalent of the complete state of Jammu and Kashmir. In terms of area it is less than 1/100 the area and less than 10 % of population. Since the exodus of Kashmiri pundits from the Valley two decades ago, these districts have become ghettoised with only one particular sect of Kashmiri Muslims dominating the region. While the Kashmiri pundits may not be willing to come back in huge numbers, the state government must encourage and facilitate the movement of Shias (from Kargil region) and Gujjars and Bakarwals (from Rajauri-Poonch region) into the Valley so that these communities can also avail of the political and economic opportunities present there. It will also integrate the Valley socially and politically with other regions of the state, thereby lending itself less susceptible to being tricked into these periodic outbursts of mob violence?

All Indians Are Special

It is true that Indian government has historically, starting from 1948, made a lot of mistakes in Kashmir. These errors have played a huge part in making the crisis that it is today. But the Indian government has made equally big mistakes in other parts of the country. Why haven't we seen a similar crisis anywhere else? Is it because we have continuously sent a message across to the Kashmiris that they are “special”, can we actually blame them for thinking that and behaving as if they are “special”? Perhaps it is also time to visibly and publicly reinforce the Constitutional dictum that all Indians are equal. And equally special.

Some ignorant commentators say that armed police and central paramilitary forces should be less visible in cities and towns. Once out of sight, the stone-pelters will have no targets to aim at. They need to know that Baramulla, Sopore, Srinagar and other major population centres are under police. Army is only deployed in less populated areas, remote areas and jungles and mountains and on the LoC.

One newspaper said halt all military measures taken to repress protests and improve the Human Rights record. Centre can't expect Kashmiri leaders to participate in talks while people are burying their children. What is to be understood is that we are at war with ISI, terrorist groups Pakistan and subversive elements lead by Hurriyat Conference and Mehbooba Mufti since 1988. The number of soldiers killed is more than all Indo-Pak wars put together. Would peace prevail if political package is announced?

Why does an eight-year-old have to be on streets to throw stones ? What about eight-year-old boy with a gun? Why do women lead protest? What if the women have guns? Why men hide behind women? Do citizens have anarchy rights under states constitution ?

Asian Centre for Human Rights (ACHR) in its latest report Torture in India 2009 states that in the last eight years (from April 2001 to March 2009), an estimated 1,184 persons were killed in police custody in India. The highest number of custodial deaths was reported in Maharashtra (192 cases) followed by Uttar Pradesh (128); Gujarat (113); Andhra Pradesh (85); West Bengal (83); Tamil Nadu (76); Assam (74); Karnataka (55); Punjab (41); Madhya Pradesh (38); Bihar and Rajasthan (32 each); Haryana (31); Kerala (30); Jharkhand (29); Delhi (25); Orissa (24); Chhattisgarh (23); Uttarakhand and Meghalaya (16 each); Arunachal Pradesh (11); Jammu and Kashmir and Tripura (9 each, in police custody). It should be state of Maharashtra which should be in flames over Human Rights issue and not J&K.

Political Solution ie RootingOut Corruption and Improving Governance

Kashmir being a political problem does not mean it is a problem between India and Pakistan to be resolved. Political problem means solving peoples grievances politically through empowering them, taking development to grass root level, improvement in governance and lessening corruption. J&K today is the most corrupt state in the country . It is estimated that upto 90 % government grant is siphoned of by politicians and government servants. Those are political solutions. Political solution does not mean challenging national sovereignty.

The Centre should be faulted for inviting the separatist Hurriyat leader Syed Ali Shah Geelani for talks. That he has asked Kashmiris to boycott the 15th August celebrations, and instead appealed for celebrating the Pakistan's Independence Day a day earlier is sufficient ground for the authorities to haul him up for sedition. A policy of firmness tempered by a genuine effort to ameliorate the socio- economic lot of ordinary Kashmiris can help wean them away from the likes of Geelani and other anti- national elements.

There is protection of Article 370 for the Kashmiri. Under this Article a Kashmiri cannot marry a non-Kashmiri and if such a marriage happens the Kashmiri will lose his right on property, voting etc. The state administration has already become Islamic. The terrorists also want Friday declared weekly holiday instead of Sunday. Non-Kashmiris cannot buy property, participate in politics or vote in the election and all rights of a citizen are denied under the law. So even Hindu migrants from across the border at the time of partition are still not given citizenship in Kashmir. For the last six decades they are fighting for their democratic rights.

We know that the Kashmiris on the Indian side are a pampered lot. Should secular India facilitate the creation of a fundamentalist Islamic state with the tax payers' money and indulgence? The country has to consider the price it is paying gratifying a recalcitrant, fanatic lot out to destroy India.

The Islamisation of Kashmir is a dangerous game. The problem

in Kashmir is not one of bread and butter. This state by the way, has the richest politicians in the country owning villas, hotels and palaces as far as London, Dubai and of course Pakistan. Creating more jobs and development in the Valley are good ideas. But that will not bring peace here. Lion's share of the development money going to Kashmir from the centre is being siphoned off by politicians and funds the insurgency of the fundamentalists. Peace is the last thing the politicians want in Kashmir. There are not many options here. India has to resolve with finality that nobody will be allowed to play with the integrity of the country. The writ of Delhi has to run in every part of the country. It has to be enforced whatever the price we have to pay. Only that clear message will douse the so-called fire in Kashmir. The Hurriyat is under the impression that if enough people are killed in street violence Indian Government will be forced into giving Azadi. One should expect the violence to continue till visit of US President to India. 'Peace in Kashmir' is far away. With more than 750-1000 terrorists in Kashmir and more than 4500 awaiting infiltration more violence can be expected in days to come.

It is high time the Centre declared clearly that the territorial sanctity and geographical boundaries of India are non-violable, that will never be allowed to be violated by any secessionist group. Any demand for separate status, special privilege or homeland should be declared a treasonable offence. The Centre has to at least uphold its primary duty of protecting the territorial integrity of the country

CONCLUSION

For everything there is a season, and a Time For Every Matter Under Heaven: a Time To Kill, And A Time To Heal; a Time To Break Down, And A Time To Build Up; a Time To Weep, And A Time To Laugh; a Time To Mourn, And A Time To Dance; a Time To Throw Away Stones, And A Time To Gather Stones Together; a Time To Embrace, And A Time To Refrain From Embracing; a Time To Tear, And A Time To Sew; a Time To Keep Silence, And A Time To Speak; a Time To Love, And A Time To Hate, a Time For War, And A Time For Peace. a Time For Action And Not Time For Paralysis By Over analysis.

PAPER PRESENTED BY BRIG (RETD) PRAMATHESH RAINA

At the outset, I wish to convey my grateful thanks to Air Marshal Kulkarni for having extended to me the invitation to participate in today's seminar. Being the third and final speaker places me at a distinct disadvantage. All that was worth saying has already been said. So I am most likely to wind up putting the audience to sleep unless I manage to say something new, different or outrageous.

I must confess, when I first heard of the word "The Kashmir Imbroglio", I was not clear about the exact meaning nor even how it was pronounced. So I thought to myself before thinking of Kashmir, let's at least understand the meaning of the term, before talking of Kashmir. The dictionary variously defines the term as "a difficult or intricate situation", "a confused mass", and "an acutely painful and embarrassing misunderstanding". Well, one thing is for sure, in the Kashmir Kashmiri context, it is all this and much more. To quote a popular saying it is a riddle wrapped in an enigma which is in turn wrapped in a puzzle.

Now coming to subject proper, Brig Mahajan has spoken about perception management, while Col Gidh has spoken about the conditions which have led to the present impasse. I will concentrate on the way ahead.

As expert after expert has stressed, Kashmir is essentially a political problem and not a military one. So there has to be a political solution to the problem. That is the point which I will be repeatedly stressing because that is precisely the angle which some of our friends in the audience keep losing sight of because of strong views arising out of a life-long involvement with the problem.

Forgive me also for going against the grain of conventional thinking and wisdom. We have had this problem on our hands for over sixty years and we are still groping in the dark for a satisfactory solution. Obviously something has been fundamentally wrong in our approach and it is time to try something new.

I will now proceed to make a few statements which should be treated as terms of reference when considering a solution which would be acceptable to both the sides and the template of which could be applicable to other regions of the country should the need arise.

- In the context of this seminar, the term “Kashmir” is basically restricted to the geographical limits of the Jhelum Valley, which in the past few months has seen violent protests. Where I mean the whole of J&K, I have used the term, “State”.

- Kashmir is an integral part of India and any solution arrived at has to be within the constitution of India. We are negotiating because we genuinely want a resolution and not from a position of weakness, real or perceived.

- Pakistan or any other country has no locus standi in the internal resolution of the conflict. However, Pakistan is definitely a stake-holder in the resolution of the conflict in so far as POK is concerned.

- We cannot own the land and disown the people. If it is accepted that Kashmir is an integral part of India, and I am sure all of us in this hall are of that opinion, then all the inhabitants of Kashmir are bona fide citizens of India, regardless of their political inclinations.

- An individual or a group can be a traitor to his/their country, but not an entire population. When that happens, it is not treason but a popular uprising, and the methods to counter the same have to be entirely different.

Stakeholders in J&K and their Aspirations

Stakeholder

The people of the State.

The people of POK

Aspirations

Peace, prosperity and “azadi” for some.

Confused. Hate Pakistan. Minimal connection with the population on the Indian side.

The people of the Northern Areas	Nowhere in the reckoning in state politics. Administered from Islamabad.
The people of India	Honorable resolution of the conflict.
The Security Forces	Same as above and return to peace time routine.
Pakistan	Raison de etre. See Kashmir as the unfinished business of partition. Happy to bleed India. See it as a revenge for Bangladesh
China	Strategic importance. Need Aksai Chin to keep the Lhasa Sinkiang route open - Karakoram Highway opens route to Indian Ocean – Control of the Muslim population of the region.
USA	Fished in troubled waters in the early 90s. Today, they consider India as an ally in the fight against terror, but would certainly ditch us if it can help them buy a durable peace in Iraq & Afghanistan

Basic Questions

- **What do the people want?** We need to correctly identify what ails the population. Unless the problems are addressed, any initiative taken towards problem resolution will be an exercise in futility. We have to understand the term “Azaadi” which has become the catch-word these days. What does it mean to the common Kashmiri? Is it Independence or the freedom to live his life without the over-bearing presence of the Security Forces (SF)?

• **Who actually speaks for Kashmir?** Though Omar Abdullah is the constitutionally elected Chief Minister, today he and the other main stream politicians do not have the crowd pulling charisma of the separatists like Syed Ali Shah Geelani. So distasteful though it may be, especially for those of us who have faced their bullets, they have to be incorporated in the dialogues. We have done that earlier in Nagaland and Mizoram, so why not now?

• **What is more relevant – size of territory or size of population?** Over 50% of the population controls just 18 % of the territory (6% of undivided J&K). Is it justified that they can claim to be the only ones who matter in the state just because they control the decibel volume and are heard the loudest?

• **Dangers of Bi/trifurcation.** There is a strong lobby in the State demanding bifurcation or even trifurcation of the State. The proposal is fraught with dangerous possibilities as it will be the first time that a State has been created on the basis of religion. This would be a tacit acceptance of the two-nation theory, which India has always rejected.

• **Statehood i.e. regional aspirations or nationhood i.e. national integrity?** The rise of parties like the DMK and the TDP was a direct result of the perceived neglect of regional aspirations by the Centre. There is no scope for mis-management and politics of convenience in the State of J&K because it is a frontline state. The people of other states do not have an option whereas the people of J&K can always look towards Pakistan or Independence.

• **What is the Nightmare Scenario for the ordinary local?** In the light of my inter-action with various levels of society, it is apparent to me that the real fear of the ordinary citizen is not getting assimilated into India. It is the fear of Kashmir getting Talibanised.


• **How to deal with narrow minds and tunnel vision?** This is the biggest problem impeding resolution of the problem. Unless leaders from both sides can rid themselves of the baggage of the

past and look at the problem from a national perspective, there can be no meeting ground. As far as the Kashmiri leadership is concerned, they are finally convinced that they cannot wrest their so called freedom by force of arms even with the support of Pakistan. That explains the shift in strategy of inciting the youth in the stone throwing demonstrations.

What should be done now?

The aim of any insurgency is to disrupt the effective functioning of the civil administration. The SF are inducted only to strengthen the civil administration and not to replace it, implying thereby that at some stage the SF are expected to withdraw. Only then can the situation be termed to have returned to normal. The more the number of troops who get sucked into anti-insurgency operations, the more successful the insurgency can be termed. The ratio of SF to population in the State is amongst the highest in the world and therefore needs to be corrected.

Like all insurgencies, the armed struggle in J&K has followed the classic stages. If we recall the various stages of the conflict resolution cycle, there are 8 in all and the armed forces have done their bit in achieving stages 4 and 5, ie restoring law and order and forcing the protestors to come to the negotiating table. The three remaining stages are dialogue, achieving consensus and initiation of corrective action. As is evident, all these activities involve the leadership at both ends. To that extent we can say that the armed forces have done their bit and can take a back seat in the proceedings till circumstances force them to take up arms again.



Talk, Talk, Talk. No modern day conflict has been resolved solely by a military victory. The victory has always been followed up endless rounds of dialogue. The more we talk, the more we can understand each other's point of view. The more we understand each other, the greater are the chances of finding a middle ground. Talk with everybody. Lay no preconditions, and accept none. It does no harm to talk. Initially the demands of the separatists will be outrageous. It doesn't matter. Gradually, stands will soften and a middle ground identified.

Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA). There has been considerable opposition to the AFSPA. When ever leaders are invited for talks, a common refrain is the repeal of the Act. For that, the response should be whether the Army is really required in Kashmir. If it is required, then so is the AFSPA. If the perception is that the Army is not required, then the AFPSA is also not required. Of

course, the Act itself can be watered down and offending portions can be deleted/reworded. But you cannot expect the Army to take over a situation without legal safeguards of sorts.

Should the Army be removed from CI Ops? In my opinion the Army should be withdrawn from its CI ops role. Not overnight, but in a process which is spaced in time and area. The main criterion should be the confidence levels of the Police force in its ability to maintain law and order in its area of responsibility. Army can remain in location for some time to help the Police should the need arise. The process would involve identifying districts which are considered relatively peaceful and capable of being self-administered. As I mentioned this process has to be gradual. This would also entail repealing of the AFSPA from those districts which are handed back to the Police. We could start from across the Pir Panjal with places like Doda, Kishtwar and Badarwah.

Resurrecting the State Police Force. The J&K Police would not have been in this mess if part of the resources which we have spent over the last 20 years had gone into improving the fibre of the State Police Force. After so many years of interventionist policies, the Americans have realized that it pays greater dividends to develop the host nation's capabilities in combating terror and maintaining law and order. An outsider force will always be unwelcome, no matter how noble their intentions. Drawing parallels from our own country, one can take the example of the State of Tripura. Tripura was an extremely disturbed state for over twenty years. Resisting constant demands for deployment of the Army, the State machinery was held together by the Assam Rifles while the State Police force was re-organized and developed to take over the situation. Today the State of Tripura ranks among one of the better policed states of the Indian Union.

Role of the Army

- Work is done as far as CI ops are concerned. As per current estimates only about 500 plus active terrorists remain in the Valley.

- Disengage but continue to remain in the Valley as a kind of threat in being.
- Enable the State Govt set up a credible anti-terrorist organization and provide training to the J&K police in CI ops.
- Double efforts and resources on intelligence gathering.
- Provide aid to civic programmes, but in a low profile manner. Let the initiative be that of the civil administration and the credit go to the local politician.
- Draw out a de-induction schedule so as to ensure that only that amount of force remains as is actually required. Unless we can do that, our claims of having restored normalcy will ring hollow.

Role of the Central Government

- Do not prop up local leaders merely because they speak the language you want to hear. Always adopt a neutral stance and let the popular leaders assume power.
- Do not discourage dissent against the elected government. The people must always have a variety of leaders to choose from. Those who cannot succeed in a legitimate way will always try the alternate route.
- Continue discussions. Talk with whoever is willing to talk with you. Eventually the solution will be found only at the discussion table
- Military domination forces the weaker party to come to the negotiating table in a sullen mood. But his sullenness disappears only when you deal with him with honour and as an equal.
- Identify and empower the genuine pro-India Kashmiri Muslim element. We have to realize that they have already

burnt their bridges by casting their lot with India. They will be hounded out and eliminated by the regime that is either pro-Independence or pro-Pakistan.

- Nurture the next generation of Kashmiri leadership being careful to make sure that they are not seen as stooges of the Govt of India. A classic example I can think of, though not in the Kashmiri context, is Hamid Karzai. His experience in India as a student and in subsequent years has left him with a definite soft spot for our country.
- We are the big brother in this partnership - magnimity is expected. Give concessions, forgive transgressions and overlook past pin-pricks if it can bring about durable peace. The nation is more important than the individual. If it helps to find a solution by dealing with known offenders, so be it.
- There is no scope for mis-management and politics of convenience in the State of J&K because it is a frontline state. The people of other states do not have an option whereas the people of J&K can always look towards Pakistan or Independence.

Short Term Measures

Strengthen the Local Adm. A normal situation demands vibrant grass roots level activity and an effective local administration. Over the years the local administration including the police force has been rendered ineffective. Mostly they have been quite willing to situation aside and let the Indian Army take charge of the situation since it keeps them insulated from the pressures of the terrorists/ANEs. Our approach should be to prop up the civil administration. We need to rectify the impression in the international media that the State is surviving only because of the presence of the SF. The credit for various schemes under Op Sadbhavana etc must be given to the local administration. The Indian Army and the SF must gradually retreat into the background.

Create a Kashmiri Super-cop. Here, we should take a leaf out of the Punjab experience. We, in the service are aware of the major role the Indian Army has played in the restoration of normalcy in Punjab. However, the credit is chiefly attributed to Mr. KPS Gill and the tough measures adopted by the Punjab Police. There are many who feel that Mr. Gill has been credited with more than his fair share of glory. However, one has to accept the fact that propaganda value of a “freedom struggle” is greatly diminished if the people fighting for and against the struggle belong to the same community as happened in Punjab. Similarly, in the case of J&K we must identify an ambitious Kashmiri Muslim police officer whose image can steadily be built up to “super-cop” status. Place adequate resources at his disposal. Give him a free hand. Every success, wherever possible, should be attributed to him. By default the responsibility for every “excess” will also be his.

Intelligence

It is vitally important to have an effective intelligence network. This period when the forces are comparatively less occupied, should be the time when intelligence gathering is at its most effective, so that the leaders are constantly abreast of the latest developments. There is so much more one can say about this. Suffice to say we need a definite intelligence upgrade and a finger on the pulse of all mischief mongers.

Psychological Operations - Power of National Symbols.

One of the major sources of irritation to the local population is the inordinate number of roadside checks of private vehicles. As a goodwill measure, it could be made known that anyone carrying an obvious Indian emblem eg. the tricolor will not be harassed. Similarly any house displaying the flag would not be searched. Even though this privilege is bound to be misused by terrorists, it will reap rich dividends for us in two ways. Initially people will be reluctant to display open loyalty to the symbol of the Indian Union. However, they will soon realize the power of the flag and wear it like a badge since it provides hassle-free passage on the road. Similarly, imagine the propaganda value, if a search party arrives in a locality, and it is greeted with Indian flags from most houses in an attempt to protect the house from being searched. Even when this privilege is misused, it

still has good propaganda value to the effect that the terrorists are sheltering behind an Indian emblem. Likewise, a person who can recite the national anthem can be deemed to be above suspicion, till proven otherwise

Attitude of the Indian Army. It should be that of detachment and aloofness, yet prepared to be called in to assist the civil administration at short notice. Initial attempts to call in the Army should be resisted with the argument that the situation can be brought under control by the Police.

Let the Police get Ruthless. People of the sub-continent are used to being exploited by their own politicians and police. Kashmir is no exception. The police are known to commit excesses. Given the proper governmental support, the police force can be highly effective in combating terrorism as is evident from the performance of the Andhra Pradesh Police. It is a known fact throughout the world that locals accept far greater atrocities at the hands of home-grown tyrants, than from well-meaning occupation forces. I use the words “occupation forces” merely to draw an analogy.

Dialogues. We need to be careful in the selection of individuals to conduct dialogues especially with grass roots leaders. Use of retired IFS officers for such parleys is a mistake, because no matter how capable, they are used to indulge in diplomatic double-speak which conveys mixed signals. They also tend to put off the other party by speaking in English or accented Hindi, making the other party feel inferior, rustic and un-educated in comparison. The vast experience of such bureaucrats must be tapped and advice sought, but the actual talks must be conducted by someone they can identify and feel comfortable with

Conclusion

That brings me to the end of my presentation. There are a lot of issues to which I have paid only lip service, due to constraints of time. However, if I was asked to convey in one sentence the essence of what I recommend, I would say that the resolution lies in continuous rounds of dialogue. I end with a rather colourful quote from a Kashmiri

Muslim PhD scholar of the University of Pune, quote - “A resolution to the problem can only be found through the sweet lips of negotiation. The more we negotiate, the greater is the chance of a negotiated settlement” - unquote.

CLOSING REMARKS BY THE CHAIRMAN

LT GEN (RETD) DR. DB SHEKATKAR

Lt Gen (Retd) Dr. DB Shekatkar thanked the three main speakers for their thoughtful and well researched presentations. He said that in the absence of strategic thinking on the subject since independence, India has only reacted to events and developments in Jammu and Kashmir. This resulted in almost permanent damage to India's national interests. Many precious lives have been lost, economy shattered and social fabric ruptured. He said that now we need to make every possible and effective effort to win the hearts and minds of the people of Kashmir through rooting out corruption, bringing about good administration and governance and integrating it with the rest of India on the economic and social front. The Central and State Governments have a very crucial and important role to bring this about. He appreciated the well informed close interaction of the main speakers with the audience and once again thanked the main speakers and all the participants in the Seminar.

CENTRE FOR ADVANCED STRATEGIC STUDIES
CASS PUBLICATIONS

Sl. No.	SEMINAR PROCEEDINGS	Date of Seminar
1	“Defence and Industry”	17 May 93
1.	“Defence and Industry”	17 May 93
2.	“Use of Force in Internal Peace Keeping”	04 Dec.93
3.	“The Emergence of China : Political, Economic and Military Implications for India”	22-23 Nov.94
4.	“First SLK Memorial Lecture” by Shri P.Chidambaram, Union Minister for Commerce.	05 Jun. 95
5.	“Human Rights : Law and Order in India”	30 Sep. 95
6.	“The Emerging Security Environment in South East Asia with Special Reference to Myanmar : Political, Economic and Military Implication for India”	02-03 Dec.95
7.	“India 2020 : An Agenda for the Nation” by Maj Gen (Retd) KS Pendse.	Feb. 96
8.	“India : The Nuclear Challenge” by Lt Gen (Retd) EA Vas, Maj Gen (Retd) KS Pendse, Dr. Col (Retd) AA Athale.	Mar. 96
9.	“Challenges to India's National Security And India's Defence Preparedness”	20-21 Apr. 96
10.	“Citizens Rights and Indian Democracy” “Second SLK Memorial Lecture” by Dr. P.C. Alexander, Governor of Maharashtra	20 Jul. 96
11.	“Challenges of Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Implications for India”	28 Aug. 96
12.	“Regional Security Environment To The North-West of India With Special Reference To Afghanistan.”	21-22 Mar. 97

Sl. No.	SEMINAR PROCEEDINGS	Date of Seminar
13.	“Changing Scenario of The Constitutional Values” “Third SLK Memorial Lecture” by Justice AM Ahmadi, Former Chief Justice of India	02 Aug. 97
14.	“Information Warfare”	24 Sep. 97
15.	“Laws of War”	09 Jan. 98
16.	“Indian Ocean - The Challenges Ahead”	06-07 Mar. 98
17.	“The Changing Pattern of India's Relations with America” “Fourth SLK Memorial Lecture” by Dr.Abid Hussain, Vice Chairman, Rajiv Gandhi Institute of Contemporary Studies.	03 Jul. 98
18.	“Pokhran II and its Implications”	01 Sep. 98
19.	“Nuclear India And The World”	08 Sep. 98
20.	“The Challenge of Terrorism”	29 Oct. 98
21.	“Foreign Policy Imperatives For Nuclear India”	26-27 Feb. 99
22.	“On Building a Globally Competitive Indian Industry : The Role of Research & Technology” “Fifth SLK Memorial Lecture” by Dr. R.A. Mashelkar Director General, Council of Scientific & Industrial Research,	22 Jul. 99
23.	“Challenges of J&K”	04 Feb. 00
24.	“Indo-Pak Relations : Challenges Ahead”	30-31 Mar. 00
25.	“Insurgency In India - Causes & Perspectives”	28 Dec. 00
26.	“Self Reliant Defence and Indian Industry” “SLK Memorial Lecture – 2000” by Shri K. Subrahmanyam, Converner, NSAB	18 Jul. 00
27.	“Governance In India : Challenges Ahead”	25 Jan. 01
28.	“India and China by 2020 : Political, Economic Sociological and Military Perspectives”	14-15 Mar. 01
29.	“Global Terrorism And India's Response”	19-20 Mar.02
30.	“Globalization And Its Impact”	

Sl. No.	SEMINAR PROCEEDINGS	Date of Seminar
	“SLK Memorial Lecture – 2002” by Dr. C. Rangarajan, Governor, Andhra Pradesh	24 Apr. 02
31.	“Governance In India” “Shri N.K. Firodia Memorial Seminar : 2002”	03 Oct.02
32.	“Globalisation And India”	19 Mar.03
33.	“Elections And Democracy in India” “Shri N.K. Firodia Memorial Seminar : 2004” by Mr. J.M. Lyngdoh, former Chief Election Commissioner, Justice B.P. Jeevan Reddy, former Justice of Supreme Court	17 Feb.04
34.	“Comprehensive Security : Need of the Hour”	25-26 Feb.04
35.	“Ombudsman, Lokayuktas, Lokpals ; Concept and Working, with Special Reference to State of Maharashtra”	25 Mar.04
36.	“Comprehensive Security II : Economic And Internal Security”	03 Mar.05
37.	“India And Its Neighbours : A Regional Security Perspective”	04 Jan.06
38.	“Probity And Propriety In Public Life” “Yashwantrao Chavan Memorial Seminar:2006” by Shri Milind Gadgil, Journalist.	03 Feb.06
39.	“Social Unrest in India : Challenges Ahead” “Yashwantrao Chavan Memorial Seminar:2007” by Dr.DN Dhanagare, former Vice Chancellor, Shivaji University, Kolhapur; Ambassador PV Joshi, IFS Addl.Secy., MEA and presently with Home Ministry for last two years	13 Mar.07
40.	“Emerging World Order And Sino Indian Relations”	21 Mar.07

Sl. No.	SEMINAR PROCEEDINGS	Date of Seminar
41.	“Aerospace Power in a Changing National Security Environment” “Air Marshal YV Malse Memorial Lecture:2007” by Air Chief Marshal FH Major, PVSM, AVSM, SC, VSM, ADC, Chief of the Air Staff	28 Jul.07
42.	“Future Environment, Perceived Threat Preceptions And Imperatives in Response” “Brigadier NB Grant Memorial Lecture:2007” by Lt Gen N. Thamburaj, SM, G.O.C.in.C., HQ, SC	02 Dec.07
43.	“Indian Democracy : Its Strengths & Weaknesses” “Professor S.V. Kogekar Memorial Lecture” by Dr. Dileep Padgaonkar,	25 May,08
44.	“India's Strategic Environment And Its Implications for Military Modernisation” Air Marshal YV Malse Memorial Lecture by Dr. Bharat Karnad	08 Jul.08
45.	“Indo-US Relations : The Changing Perspective”	22 Oct.08
46.	“Challenges Before the Fifteenth Lok Sabha” “Professor S.V. Kogekar Memorial Lecture” by Dr. Madhav Godbole, former Home Secretary, Govt. of India	26 May,09
47.	“Secularism in India : Meaning andPractice” “Yashwantrao Chavan Memorial Lecture” by Justice Narendra Chapalgaonkar	14 May,10
48.	“Right to Information : Reality and Rhetoric” “Professor S.V. Kogekar Memorial Lecture” by Mr. Wajahat Habibullaj, Chief Information Commissioner, Govt. of India	26 May,10
49.	“West Asia : A Factor in India's Security and Foreign Relations”	21 Apr.10

Sl. No.	SEMINAR PROCEEDINGS	Date of Seminar
50.	“Essentials of an Aerospace Power : India Context” “Air Marshal YV Malse Memorial Lecture” by Air Marshal PK Barbora, PVSM, VM, ADC, Vice Chief of the Air Staff, IAF	09 Jul.10
51.	“Naxalism and Maoism and Indian Army”	26 Aug.10
52.	“Indo-Pak Relations and The USA”	17 Sep.10
53.	“The Kashmir Imbroglio”	29 Oct.10
54.	“Value System in the Armed Forces” “Brigadier NB Grant Memorial Lecture” By Lt Gen (Retd) Ashok Joshi, PVSM, AVSM	18 Dec.10
55.	“Poverty Alleviation in India : Challenges Ahead” “Yashwantrao Chavan Memorial Lecture” By Dr. YSP Thorat, Former Chairman, NABARD & Chief Executive Officer, Rajiv Gandhi Charitable Trust, New Delhi	13 Jan.11